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Abstract
We study Fisher markets and the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare (NSW), and show
several closely related new results. In particular, we obtain:
• A new integer program for the NSW maximization problem whose fractional relaxation has a
bounded integrality gap. In contrast, the natural integer program has an unbounded integrality gap.
• An improved, and tight, factor 2 analysis of the algorithm of [7]; in turn showing that the integrality
gap of the above relaxation is at most 2. The approximation factor shown by [7] was 2e1/e ≈ 2.89.
• A lower bound of e1/e ≈ 1.44 on the integrality gap of this relaxation.
• New convex programs for natural generalizations of linear Fisher markets and proofs that these
markets admit rational equilibria.
These results were obtained by establishing connections between previously known disparate results,
and they help uncover their mathematical underpinnings. We show a formal connection between the
convex programs of Eisenberg and Gale and that of Shmyrev, namely that their duals are equivalent up
to a change of variables. Both programs capture equilibria of linear Fisher markets. By adding suitable
constraints to Shmyrev’s program, we obtain a convex program that captures equilibria of the spending-
restricted market model defined by [7] in the context of the NSW maximization problem. Further, adding
certain integral constraints to this program we get the integer program for the NSW mentioned above.
The basic tool we use is convex programming duality. In the special case of convex programs with
linear constraints (but convex objectives), we show a particularly simple way of obtaining dual programs,
putting it almost at par with linear program duality. This simple way of finding duals has been used
subsequently for many other applications.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Cole and Gkatzelis [7] gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm for the problem of
maximizing the Nash social welfare (NSW). In this problem, a set of indivisible goods needs to be allocated
to agents with additive utilities, and the goal is to compute an allocation that maximizes the geometric mean
of the agents’ utilities. The natural integer program for this problem is closely related to the Fisher market
model: if we relax the integrality constraint of the allocation, i.e., assume that the the goods are divisible, this
program reduces to the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program [11], whose solutions correspond to market
equilibria for the linear Fisher market. Therefore, a canonical approach for designing a NSW approximation
algorithm would be to compute a fractional allocation via the EG program, and then “round” it to get an
integral one. However, [7] observed that this program’s integrality gap is unbounded, and they were forced
to follow an unconventional approach in analyzing their algorithm. This algorithm used an alternative
fractional allocation, the spending-restricted (SR) equilibrium, and they had to come up with an independent
upper bound of the optimal NSW in order to prove that the approximation factor is at most 2e1/e ≈ 2.89.
The absence of a conventional analysis for this problem could be, in part, to blame for the lack of
progress on important follow-up problems (e.g., see Section 7). For instance, the SR equilibrium introduces
constraints that are incompatible with the EG program, so [7] had to use a complicated algorithm for com-
puting this allocation. Generalizing such an algorithm may be non-trivial, and so would proving new upper
bounds for the optimal NSW. In this paper we remove this obstacle by uncovering the underlying structure
of the NSW problem and shedding new light on the results of [7]. Specifically, we propose a new integer
program which, as we show, also computes the optimal NSW allocation. More importantly, we prove that
the relaxation of this program computes the SR equilibrium, and, quite surprisingly, we also show that the
objective of this program happens to be precisely the upper bound that was used in [7]. As a result, this
new integer program yields a convex program for computing the SR equilibrium and, unlike the standard
program, it has an integrality gap that is bounded by 2.89. In addition to this, we give a family of instances
showing a lower bound of e1/e ≈ 1.44 on the integrality gap, and we provide a tight analysis of the algo-
rithm of [7] to show that its approximation factor is 2, which also puts an upper bound of 2 on the integrality
gap of the new program.
Apart from the results regarding the NSW problem, we also reveal interesting connections between
seemingly disparate results, and we provide convex programs for computing market equilibria in interesting
generalizations of Fisher’s market model. For instance, besides the EG program, there is another very
different convex program for the linear Fisher market, due to Shmyrev [22]; however, there were no known
connections between these two programs. Using our techniques, we show that one can define a dual program
for each of them, and the two duals are the same, up to a change of variables. Furthermore, by adding suitable
constraints to Shmyrev’s program, we obtain the convex program that captures the SR equilibria.
The spending-restricted market model is a generalization of Fisher’s market model and has potential use
beyond its NSW application. Under this model, sellers can declare an upper bound on the money they wish
to earn in the market (and take back their unsold good). Therefore, the total amount of money that the buyers
can spend on this seller’s good is bounded. Assume that each seller is selling his services in the market. In
the last half century, society has seen the emergence of a multitude of very high end jobs which call for a
lot of expertise and in turn pay very large salaries. Indeed, the holders of such jobs do not need to work full
time to make a comfortable living and one sees numerous such people preferring to work for shorter hours
and having a lot more time for leisure. High end dentists, doctors and investors fall in this category. The
spending restricted model allows such agents to specify a limit on their earnings beyond which they do not
wish to sell their services anymore.
Another generalization of the linear Fisher model that we study is the utility restricted (UR) model. In
this model, buyers can declare an upper bound on the amount of utility they wish to derive (and take back
the unused part of their money). This model is natural as well: in thrift, it is reasonable to assume that a
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buyer would only want to buy goods that are absolutely necessary, i.e., place an upper bound amount on
utility, and not spend all of her money right away.
Thus, in the SR model, the supply of a good is a function of the prices and, in the UR model, the
amount of money a buyer spends in the market is a function of the prices. In the presence of these additional
constraints, do equilibria exist and can they be computed in polynomial time? We give a convex program
for the second model as well, this time by generalizing the EG program. Existence of equilibria for both
models follows from these convex programs. We further show that both models admit rational equilibria,
i.e., prices and allocations are rational numbers if all parameters specified in the instance are rational. As a
consequence, the ellipsoid algorithm will find a solution to the convex programs in polynomial time.
For some of the results listed above, the techniques that we use are based on convex program duality. We
consider a special class of convex programs, those with convex objective functions and linear constraints,
and show that the duals can be constructed using a simple set of rules,1 which are almost as simple as
those for linear programs. We note that convex programming duality is usually stated in its most general
form, with convex objective functions and convex constraints, e.g., see the excellent references by Boyd
and Vandenberghe [2] and Rockafellar [21]. At this level of generality the process of constructing the dual
of a convex program is quite tedious. Following an earlier version of this paper2, these rules have found
serveral additional applications in deriving convex programs: for Fisher markets under spending constraint
utilities [1], Fisher markets with transaction costs [5], Arrow-Debreu market with linear utilities [10], and
Fisher markets with reserve prices [8]. They have also been used in the design of algorithms: for simplex-
like algorithms for spending constraint utilities and perfect price discrimination markets [13], in analyzing
the convergence of the tatonnement process [6], in designing online algorithms for scheduling [4, 9, 15], and
online algorithms for welfare maximization with production costs [14]. Finally, they have also been used in
bounding the price of anarchy of certain games [18].
2 Preliminaries
Fisher’s market model is the following: let M be a set of m divisible goods and N be a set of n buyers.
Each buyer i comes to the market with a budget of Bi and we may assume w.l.o.g. that the market has one
unit of each good. Each buyer i has a utility function, ui : Rm+ → R+, giving the utility that i derives
from each bundle of goods. The utility of buyer i is said to be linear if there are parameters vij ∈ R+,
specifying the value derived by i from one unit of good j. Her utility for the entire bundle is additive,
i.e., ui(x) =
∑
j∈M vijxij . Utility function ui is said to be quasi-linear if, agents have utility for the
money spent as well, i.e., ui(x) =
∑
j∈M (vij − pj)xij . Utility function ui is said to be Leontief if, given
parameters aij ∈ R+ ∪ {0} for each good j ∈ M , ui(x) = minj∈M xij/aij . Finally, ui is said to be
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with parameter ρ if given parameters αj for each good j ∈ M ,
ui(x) =
(∑m
j=1 αjx
ρ
j
) 1
ρ
. Throughout the main body of the paper we assume that the utilities are linear
unless we note otherwise.
Market equilibrium: Let pj ∈ R+ be the price of good j and xij ∈ R+ denote the amount of good j
allocated to buyer i. (We use p and x to denote the vectors of all prices and allocations, respectively.) These
are said to form an equilibrium if the following conditions hold.
1. The allocation of each buyer i maximizes his utility, subject to her budget constraint, ∑j pjxij ≤ Bi.
1The dual is obtained using the usual Lagrangian relaxation technique. We show a “short-cut” for applying this technique,
making it especially easy to derive the dual for the special case we consider.
2The part of the current paper about convex programming duality had been made available online since 2010 as the following
unpublished manuscript: N. R. Devanur, Fisher Markets and Convex Programs. The manuscript is now incorporated into this paper.
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2. Each good j that has a price pj > 0 is allocated fully, i.e.,
∑
i xij = 1. A good is allowed to have
price pj = 0 as long as
∑
i xij ≤ 1.
Two natural generalizations of Fisher’s model that we consider are the following. In the first model
which we call Spending-Restricted (SR) model, each seller j has an upper bound cj on the amount of money
j wants to earn in the market. Once he earns cj , selling the least amount of his good, he wants to take
back the unsold portion of his good. In other words, the amount of money spent on the good of seller j is
restricted by cj . In equilibrium, buyers spend all their money and get an optimal bundle of goods. Formally,
the second equilibrium condition above is modified to ∀j ∈M,
∑
i xij ≤ 1, and
∑
i pjxij ≤ cj , and either∑
i xij = 1, or
∑
i pjxij = cj , or pj = 0.
In the second model which we call Utility-Restricted (UR) model, buyers have upper bounds di on the utility
they want to derive in the market. Once buyer i derives utility di, spending the least amount of money at
prices p, she wants to keep the left-over money. In other words, the utility of buyer i is restricted by di. In
equilibrium, each good with a positive price should be fully sold. Formally, the first equilibrium condition
is modified to ∀i ∈ N,ui(x) ≤ di, and
∑
j pjxij ≤ Bi, and either
x minimizes
∑
j pjxij s.t. ui(x) = di, or maximizes ui(x) s.t.
∑
j pjxij ≤ Bi.
Given an equilibrium (p, x), we denote the total money spent on item j by qj , and the money that agent
i spends on item j by bij . The spending graph, Q(b), of a given spending vector b, is a bipartite graph where
the set of agents corresponds to vertices of one side of the graph and the set of items corresponds to vertices
of the other side. Each agent i is connected to the items that she spends money on, i.e., there is an edge
between i and j if and only if bij > 0. Note that each agent only spends money on the set of her maximum
“bang per buck” items, i.e., the set of items that maximize vij/pj . Therefore, by assuming some unique tie
breaking rule among goods we can rearrange the spending to ensure that the spending graph is a forest of
trees. Throughout this paper we assume that the spending graph is always a forest of trees.
Nash Social Welfare: Given a set M of m indivisible items and a set N of n agents, an integral allocation
of items to agents restricts the allocation xij to lie in the set {0, 1}. The Nash social welfare (NSW) (also
known as Bernoulli-Nash social welfare) of an integral allocation x is defined as the geometric mean of
the agents utilities, i.e., (
∏
i∈N ui(x))
1/n [17, 20]. The NSW maximization problem is to find an integral
allocation that maximizes the NSW. (We may assume w.l.o.g. that n ≤ m for this problem.) Cole and
Gkatzelis [7] considered this problem when agents have linear utilities, and gave a 2e1/e ≈ 2.89 factor
approximation for it. We now state the upper bound on the optimum value that is used in their result.
Consider an SR market with the same items and agents and utilities. Suppose the items are divisible and
have spending restriction of 1 on all items, i.e., ∀j ∈ M , cj = 1. Let x¯ and p¯ be an equilibrium allocation
and price vector of the market. Note that multiplying all the vij values of a given agent i by the same
positive number does not change the optimal solution or the approximation factor for the problem. In an
equilibrium allocation all goods allocated to an agent must have the same “bang per buck” ratio vij/p¯j (as
was shown in [7]). We can therefore normalize each agent’s valuations so that vij = p¯j if x¯ij > 0, without
loss of generality. We henceforth assume that the valuations are normalized this way in every NSW problem
instance. Given such a scaling, we define the following quantity which was used in [7] as an upper bound
on the optimal NSW value.
SR-UB :=
(∏
j∈M :p¯j≥1
p¯j
)1/n
.
We now state the following lemma that is proved by [7].
Lemma 1 ([7]). For linear utilities, maxxij∈{0,1}
(∏
i∈N ui(x)
)1/n
≤ SR-UB.
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3 Convex programming duality
3.1 Fenchel Conjugate
We now define the Fenchel conjugate of a function, and note some of its properties; see Rockafellar [21]
for a detailed treatment. This will be the key ingredient in extending the simple set of rules for LP duality
to convex programs. Suppose that f : Rn → R is a function. The conjugate of f is f∗ : Rn → R and is
defined as f∗(µ) := supx{µTx− f(x)}. Although the conjugate is defined for any function f , for the rest
of the article we will assume that f is strictly convex and differentiable, since this is the case that is most
interesting to the applications we discuss.
Properties of f∗: We note some useful properties here. See Appendix A for more properties.
• If µ and x are such that f(x) + f∗(µ) = µTx then ∇f(x) = µ and ∇f∗(µ) = x.
• Vice versa, if ∇f(x) = µ then ∇f∗(µ) = x and f(x) + f∗(µ) = µTx.
We say that (x, µ) form a complementary pair w.r.t. f if they satisfy either one of these two conditions.
3.2 Convex programs with linear constraints
Suppose that we have a convex program with a convex/concave objective function and linear constraints.
We can derive another convex program that is the dual of this, using Lagrangian duality. This is usually a
long calculation. The goal of this section is to identify a shortcut for the same.
Lemma 2. The following pairs of convex programs are duals of each other, i.e., the optimum of the primal
is at most the optimum of the dual (weak duality). If the primal is infeasible, then the dual is unbounded
(and vice versa).
Primal: max
∑
i cixi − f(x) s.t.
∀ j,
∑
i aijxi ≤ bj ,
Dual: min
∑
j bjλj + f
∗(µ) s.t.
∀ i,
∑
j aijλj = ci − µi,
∀ j, λj ≥ 0.
If the primal constraints are strictly feasible, i.e., there exists xˆ such that for all j ∑i aij xˆi < bj , then the
two optima are the same (strong duality) and the following generalized complementary slackness conditions
characterize them:
• xi > 0⇒
∑
j aijλj = ci − µi, λj > 0⇒
∑
i aijxi = Bi and
• x and µ form a complementary pair wrt f , i.e., µ = ∇f(x), x = ∇f∗(µ) and f(x) + f∗(µ) = µTx.
The proofs of all lemmas in this section are in Appendix A. Note the similarity to LP duality. When an
LP is infeasible the dual becomes unbounded. The same happens with these convex programs as well. The
differences are as follows. Suppose the concave part of the primal objective is −f(x). There is an extra
variable µi for every variable xi that occurs in f . In the constraint corresponding to xi, the term−µi appears
on the RHS along with the constant term. Finally the dual objective has f∗(µ) in addition to the linear terms.
In other words, we relax the constraint corresponding to xi by allowing a slack of µi, and charge f∗(µ) to
the objective function.
Similarly, the primal program with non-negativity constraints on variables and the corresponding dual
program take the following form.
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Primal: max
∑
i cixi − f(x) s.t.
∀ j,
∑
i aijxi ≤ bj ,
∀ i, xi ≥ 0.
Dual: min
∑
j bjλj + f
∗(µ) s.t.
∀ i,
∑
j aijλj ≥ ci − µi,
∀ j, λj ≥ 0.
The dual of a minimization program has the following form.
Primal: min
∑
i cixi + f(x) s.t.
∀ j,
∑
i aijxi ≥ bj ,
∀ i, xi ≥ 0.
Dual: max
∑
j bjλj − f
∗(µ) s.t.
∀ i,
∑
j aijλj ≤ ci + µi,
∀ j, λj ≥ 0.
4 Convex programs for Fisher markets
We now use the technology developed in the previous section to show a formal connection between the
Eisenberg-Gale and Shmyrev convex programs, both of which are known to capture equilibria of linear
Fisher markets as their optima. As a first step we construct the dual of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program.
Lemma 3. The following pairs of convex programs are duals of each other. The dual variables pj of an
optimal solution are equilibrium prices of the corresponding linear Fisher market.
EG Program: max
∑
iBi log ui s.t.
∀ i, ui ≤
∑
j vijxij ,
∀ j,
∑
i xij ≤ 1,
xij ≥ 0.
min
∑
j pj −
∑
iBi log(βi) s.t. (1)
∀ i, j, pj ≥ vijβi.
In fact, we can even eliminate the βi’s by observing that in an optimal solution, βi = minj {pj/vij}.
This gives a convex (but not strictly convex) function of the pj’s that is minimized at equilibrium. Note that
this is an unconstrained3 minimization. The function is
∑
j pj −
∑
iBi log(minj {pj/vij}). An interesting
property of this function is that the (sub)gradient of this function at any price vector corresponds to the
(set of) excess supply of the market with the given price vector. This implies that a tattonement style price
update, where the price is increased if the excess supply is negative and is decreased if it is positive, is
actually equivalent to gradient descent. This fact was used to analyze the convergence of the tatonnement
process in [6]. A convex program that is very similar to (1) was also discovered independently by Garg [12].
However it is not clear how they arrived at it, or if they realize that this is the dual of the Eisenberg-Gale
convex program. Going back to Convex Program (1), we write an equivalent program by taking the logs in
each of the constraints.
min
∑
j pj −
∑
iBi log(βi) s.t
∀ i, j, log pj ≥ log vij + log βi.
Replacing qj = log pj and γi = − log βi as the variables, we get the following convex program (2), and its
dual (CP).
3Although with some analysis, one can derive that the optimum solution satisfies that pj ≥ 0, and
∑
j
pj =
∑
i
Bi, the program
itself has no constraints.
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Lemma 4. The following convex programs are duals of each other.
min
∑
j e
qj +
∑
iBiγi s.t. (2)
∀ i, j, γi + qj ≥ log vij.
max
∑
i,j bij log vij −
∑
j(pj log pj − pj) s.t. (CP)
∀ j,
∑
i bij = pj ,
∀ i,
∑
j bij = Bi,
∀ i, j, bij ≥ 0.
By abuse of notation, we use pj for the variables in (CP) since it turns out that these once again corre-
spond to equilibrium prices. We can remove the −pj at the end of the objective in (CP) since the constraints
imply that
∑
j pj =
∑
iBi, which is a constant. On removing these terms, we get the convex program of
Shmyrev [22]. Thus (CP) and EG convex programs have the same dual, modulo a change of variables!
Quasi-linear utilities: For some markets, it is not clear how to generalize the Eisenberg-Gale convex
program, but the dual generalizes easily, and the optimality conditions can be easily seen to be equivalent to
equilibrium conditions. We now show an example of this. Recall that a buyer i has a quasi-linear utility if it
is of the form
∑
j(vij − pj)xij . In particular, if all the prices are such that pj > vij , then the buyer prefers
to not be allocated any good and go back with his budget unspent. It is easy to see that the following convex
program (3) captures equilibrium prices for such utilities. In fact, given this convex program, one could take
its dual to get an EG-type convex program as well. Although this is a small modification of the EG program,
it is not clear how one would arrive at this directly without going through the dual.
Lemma 5. The following pairs of convex programs are duals of each other, and capture the equilibria of
Fisher markets with quasi-linear utilities as their optima.
min
∑
j pj −
∑
iBi log(βi) s.t. (3)
∀ i, j, pj ≥ vijβi,
∀ i, βi ≤ 1.
max
∑
iBi log ui − vi s.t.
∀ i, ui ≤
∑
j vijxij + vi,
∀ j,
∑
i xij ≤ 1,
∀i, j, xij, vi ≥ 0.
Summary and Extensions: In this section we showed two applications of the convex programming du-
ality in Section 3, the relation between the EG and Shmyrev convex programs, and a convex program for
Quasi-linear utilities. We mention other applications of this tool in the introduction, some of which are in
Appendix A. We give a convex program that captures SR equilibrium, and study existence, uniqueness and
rationality of equilibrium in Appendix B. Further, the same analysis can be extended to what are called
spending constraint utilities (Appendix C). We do the same (convex programs, existence, uniqueness and
rationality) for UR markets with linear, Leontief and CES utilities in Appendix D. The convex program for
the SR model is closely related to NSW maximization, as we will discuss in the next section.
5 A new program for the Nash social welfare problem
In this section we focus on the APX-hard problem of maximizing the NSW with indivisible items [7, 19].
When the agents have linear valuations, this problem has a natural representation as a convex program (see
program on the left below). In this program, there is a variable xij for each agent i and item j and its value
is either 0 or 1, depending on whether the agent is allocated the item or not. An appealing property of this
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program is that, if we relax the constraint that xij ∈ {0, 1}, then the program reduces to the Eisenberg-
Gale program4, which can be solved in polynomial time. This opens the way for a standard approach for
designing an approximation algorithm: compute the fractional allocation using the EG program and then use
a rounding algorithm to get a good integral allocation. Unfortunately, as was shown in [7], the integrality
gap of this program is unbounded, so this approach is doomed to fail.
Facing the unbounded integrality gap obstacle, [7] take a non-standard approach in designing an approx-
imation algorithm. Motivated by the market equilibrium interpretation of the EG program, they propose the
spending-restricted equilibrium, and they then independently prove an upper bound for the optimal NSW
value (which we call SR-UB, see Lemma 1). They then “round” the fractional allocation implied by the
SR equilibrium, and compare the NSW of the rounded solution to SR-UB. In this section, we propose a
new integer program, which we refer to as the spending-restricted (SR) program (see program on the right
below)5, and show the following results.
• The optimal solution of the SR program corresponds to the NSW maximizing integral allocation, and
the optimal objective function value of this program is equal to the optimal NSW value.
• The fractional relaxation of this program computes the SR equilibrium.
• The objective value of the fractional relaxation is equal to the upper bound SR-UB.
• This relaxation therefore has an integrality gap of at most 2e1/e ≈ 2.89. We also show a lower bound
of e1/e ≈ 1.44 on this integrality gap.
max (
∏
i ui)
1/n s.t.
∀i, ui =
∑
j xijvij
∀j,
∑
i xij = 1
∀i, j, xij ∈ {0, 1}.
max
(∏
i
∏
j v
bij
ij
∏
j q
qj
j
)1/n
s.t. (SR)
∀j,
∑
i bij = qj
∀i,
∑
j bij = 1
∀i, j, qj ≤ 1, bij ∈ {0, qj}
Unlike the standard program for the NSW problem, the SR program uses variables qj and bij ∈ {0, qj}.
Any solution to this program, corresponds to an allocation of indivisible items to agents. In particular, an
agent i is allocated an item j if and only if bij = qj .6 If we relax the constraint that bij ∈ {0, qj} and apply
a logarithmic transformation of the objective function, we get a convex program, which we can compute in
polynomial time. We call this relaxation the f-SR program. Note that the spending constraint (qj ≤ 1) is not
binding in the SR program, but this is not true for f-SR.
The following lemma shows that the two programs above do, in fact, compute the same allocation.
Lemma 6. The optimal solution of the SR program corresponds to the NSW maximizing allocation of indi-
visible items to agents. The objective function value of this solution is equal to the optimal NSW value.
Proof. Suppose that we fix the integral choices, i.e., for each i and j we fix whether bij = 0 or bij = qj . For
all j, due to the constraint that
∑
i bij = qj , there can only be one i such that bij = qj . Hence determining the
integral choices is equivalent to determining an integral allocation. Let Si denote the set of items allocated
to i in this integral allocation. We show that given these integral choices, setting bij = vij∑
k∈Si
vik
makes the
4To verify this fact, apply a logarithmic transformation to the objective.
5The SR program is not, strictly speaking, presented as an integer program, but we could introduce a new variable aj for each
item j and replace the constraint bij ∈ {0, qj} with the constraints bij = aijqj and aij ∈ {0, 1} to make it an integer program.
6Note that we can assume ∀j, qj > 0 in an equilibrium w.l.o.g. because if qj = 0 then the equilibrium conditions imply the
value of item j is zero for all agents.
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objective function equal to the NSW of the allocation, and this is indeed the optimal (objective maximizing)
choice of these variables. The first part follows from this sequence of equalities.
(∏
i
∏
j v
bij
ij
∏
j q
qj
j
)1/n
=
(∏
i
∏
j∈Si
v
bij
ij
b
bij
ij
)1/n
=
(∏
i
∏
j∈Si
(∑
k∈Si
vik
)bij)1/n = (∏i∑k∈Si vik)1/n
For the rest of the proof, we work with the log transformation of the objective. Given the integral
choices, the SR program decomposes into a sum of separate mathematical programs, one for each buyer i.
max
∑
j∈Si
(bij log vij − bij log bij) s.t.
∀i,
∑
j∈Si
bij = 1, and ∀i, j ∈ Si, bij ≥ 0.
This is the same as minimizing the relative entropy, or KL-divergence, between two probability distributions,
where the bijs form one probability distribution, and the other distribution is given by vij∑
k∈Si
vik
. By Gibbs’
inequality, it is known that this is minimized when the two distributions are the same, i.e., when bij =
vij∑
k∈Si
vik
. (We give an alternate proof of Gibbs’ inequality using convex program duality in Appendix A.)
5.1 Relaxation of the SR program
In designing their approximation algorithm for the NSW problem in [7], they used, as an intermediate step,
a fractional allocation, which was the equilibrium of a spending-restricted market with cj = 1 for all j. If
the price of an item j is pj , then this constraint could be expressed as
∑
i xijpj ≤ 1. But, they could not
introduce this constraint into the EG program, since it combines both the primal variables xij and the dual
variable pj . In the absence of a program that could compute this fractional solution, they instead had to
propose a complicated market equilibrium computation algorithm. Lemma 7 shows that in the SR program,
once we drop the constraint that bij ∈ {0, qj}, the relaxed program, f-SR, computes the SR equilibrium.
Unlike the EG program, the constraint that the total spending on any given item is at most 1 involves only
the primal variables qj . If we also apply a logarithmic transformation to the objective function, then we get
the convex program (CP) of Section 4, with the additional constraint that qj ≤ 1. As a result, we provide a
simple convex program that can compute the SR equilibrium. The proof of the following lemma essentially
shows that the complementary slackness conditions are equivalent to market equilibrium conditions.
Lemma 7. The f-SR program computes the SR equilibrium. The variables bij capture the amount of money
spent by buyer i on good j, and the variables qj capture the total spending on good j. The prices pj can be
recovered from the optimal dual variables.
Existence and uniqueness of the SR equilibrium: We study existence and uniqueness of the SR equilib-
rium in Appendix B. We show an SR equilibrium exists if and only if
∑
j cj ≥
∑
iBi. On the uniqueness
side, we show that the spending vector q = (q1, . . . , qm), where qj is the money spent on good j, is unique.
Although in the Fisher model we have the uniqueness of price equilibrium, it is easy to see that this is not
true for the SR equilibrium. Consider a market with only one buyer with utility function u(x) = x1 and one
seller. Let B1 = 1 and c1 = 1. It is easy to see every price bigger than 1 is an SR equilibrium price.
Relation to SR-UB: Quite surprisingly, we also show that the optimal objective value of the f-SR program
is the same, up to scaling of the valuations, as the upper bound used by [7], which we called SR-UB.
Lemma 8. The optimal value of the f-SR program is equal to SR-UB.
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Proof. Let b¯ij and q¯j be an optimum solution to the f-SR program, and x¯ and p¯ be equilibrium allocation
and price vectors resp. From Lemma 7, the relation between these is that b¯ij = p¯jx¯ij and q¯j = min{1, p¯j}.
Recall that, from the definition of SR-UB, we normalize each agent’s valuations so that vij = p¯j if x¯ij > 0.
With this scaling of the valuations, the objective function of the f-SR program becomes
(
∏
i
∏
j v
b¯ij
ij
∏
j q¯
q¯j
j
)1/n
=
(
∏
j p¯
∑
i b¯ij
j
∏
j q¯
q¯j
j
)1/n
=
(∏
j (p¯j/q¯j)
q¯j
)1/n
=
(∏
j:p¯j≥1
p¯j
)1/n
,
where in the last equality, we used the fact that p¯j = q¯j if p¯j < 1 and q¯j = 1 otherwise.
The SR program integrality gap: Given Lemmas 6, 7, and 8, a lower bound on the integrality gap of the
SR program also implies a lower bound on the best approximation factor that one can show by rounding a
solution to f-SR, and comparing the objective obtained to SR-UB. The next lemma provides such a lower
bound for the integrality gap.
Lemma 9. The integrality gap of the program above is at least e1/e ≈ 1.44.
Proof. Consider an instance with n bidders and m = (1 + f)n items, where f ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Each
agent i has a value of 0 for the first n items, except item i, for which his value is (1− f). The value of every
agent for items n + 1 to m, hence referred to as the “valuable” items, is equal to V , which is much higher
than 1. In the SR equilibrium for this instance, the prices will be (1− f) for the first n items and V for the
rest. Each agent i will be spending (1 − f) of his budget on item i and the remaining budget of f on the
valuable items.
The objective value for this fractional solution would therefore be equal to V f . On the other hand, any
integral allocation would have to assign each one of the valuable items to a distinct agent, so the optimal
NSW would be (1− f)1−f · (1− f + V )f . If we let V go to infinity, this leads to an integrality gap of
limV→∞
(
V f
(1−f)1−f ·(1−f+V )f
)
= 1
(1−f)1−f
which, for f = (e− 1)/e, yields the desired e1/e integrality gap7.
6 A Tight Analysis of the Spending-Restricted Rounding Algorithm
Using the SR equilibrium as a starting point, [7] proposed the a rounding algorithm called the Spending-
Restricted Rounding (SRR) algorithm. Using SR-UB as an upper bound, they showed that the approximation
factor of this algorithm is at most 2e1/e ≈ 2.89. The first step of the SRR algorithm is to compute the SR
equilibrium which, in light of the previous section’s results, we can now do using the f-SR convex program.
Then, for each tree of the spending graph Q(b), it chooses an arbitrary agent as the root and assigns all items
that are either leaves or have qj ≤ 1/2 to their parent-agent. The remaining items are matched to agents
using the matching with the optimal NSW value, given the previous assignments. This matching can be
computed in polynomial using a maximum weight matching algorithm and log vij as weights instead of vij
(see [7] for more details). The (full) proofs of this section are deferred to Appendix E.
Using a careful analysis, we now show that the approximation factor of the SRR algorithm is, in fact,
better than 2.89 by proving an upper bound of 2. We conclude this section with a matching lower bound.
Theorem 1. The approximation factor of the SRR algorithm is at most 2.
7To be precise, to make sure that m is an integer, fn would also have to be an integer. Therefore, we as we let n be arbitrarily
large, f can take values arbitrarily close to (e− 1)/e while fn remains an integer.
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Algorithm 1: Spending-Restricted Rounding (SRR) [7].
1 Compute a spending-restricted equilibrium (b, q).
2 Choose a root-agent for each tree in the spending graph Q(b).
3 Assign any leaf-item in the trees to its parent-agent.
4 Assign any item j with qj ≤ 1/2 to its parent-agent.
5 Compute the optimal matching of the remaining items to adjacent agents.
Proof Sketch. For each item j that has more than one child-agent in the spending graph Q(b), remove the
edges connecting it to all but the one child-agent that spends the most money on j, i.e., the one with the
largest bij value. This yields a pruned spending graph P (b) that is also a forest of trees. We refer to the
trees of the pruned graph P (b) as the matching-trees. In every matching-tree T with k ≥ 2 agents, when
the algorithm reaches its last step, every remaining item has exactly one parent-agent and one child-agent,
so all but one agent can be matched to one of these items. Our proof shows that there exists a matching of
the remaining items such that the agents within T have a “high” NSW.
A naive way to match the agents in the last step of the algorithm would be to match all of them, except
the one that has accrued the highest value during the previous steps. It was already observed in [7] that,
for any matching-tree T of k agents, there exists an agent who was assigned value at least 1/(2k) during
Steps 3 and 4 of the algorithm, so we could match every agent in T , except him. But, what is the worst case
distribution of value that can arise in this matching? We show that the worst case arises for matching-trees
that contain a single agent and no items with pj > 1/2. But, even in this case, such an agent got all the items
that he was spending on in the SR equilibrium, except one, and he could not be spending more than half of
his budget on the one he lost. To verify this fact, note that he either lost this item because the total money
spent on the item was less than half, i.e., qj ≤ 1/2, and it was assigned to its parent at Step 4, or because the
edge connecting him to this item was pruned in the transition from Q(b) to P (b). But, in both of these cases,
he could not be spending more than 1/2 on that item, so he got at least half of his SR equilibrium value.
The more demanding part of the proof is to show that the worst case arises for matching-trees of size
1. In contrast to the analysis of [7], we use the vital observation that, if the agent of some matching-tree T
who does not get matched to an item has value vα, then every other agent i ∈ T gets value at most vij + vα,
where j is the item that he was matched to in the last step. Lemma 25 uses this fact to prove that in the worst
case distribution of value, at least
⌊
k−2vα
1+2vα
⌋
agents get value greater than, or equal to, 1. In other words,
this new lemma shows that, if the unmatched agent were to leave a lot of value on the table, then this value
would not end up with just a few agents but, rather, it would have to be well distributed among the remaining
agents. Building further on this observation, Lemma 26 shows that, for any matching-tree T with k agents,
the allocation x′ induced by the naive matching algorithm satisfies∏
i∈T vi(x
′) ≥ 1
2k
∏
j∈T :pj≥1
pj.
Since the allocation x that the SRR algorithm outputs is at least as good as the one by the naive matching,
we can combine this inequality with the SR-UB upper bound to get the desired approximation factor bound:
(
∏
i vi(x))
1/n =
(∏
T
∏
i∈T vi(x)
)1/n
≥ 12
(∏
j:pj≥1
pj
)1/n
.
Lemma 10. The approximation factor of the SRR algorithm is exactly 2.
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7 Discussion
Regarding additional Fisher market extensions, an obvious open question is to obtain a convex program for
the common generalization of the spending-restricted and utility-restricted markets, in which buyers have
utility bounds and sellers have earning bounds, for the case of linear utilities.
Regarding the NSW problem, we have addressed the symmetric case of NSW, which assumes that
all agents have equal budget (or clout). While introducing the Nash bargaining problem [20], Nash only
considered the symmetric case but, soon after that, Kalai proposed the non-symmetric case as well, which
is also well-studied. Hence a natrual open problem is to obtain a constant factor approximation algorithm
for the non-symmetric case of NSW. The objective in this generalization is to maximize
(∏
i u
Bi
i
)1/B
,
where Bi is the budget of agent i and B =
∑
iBi. Another important generalization of NSW would be
to consider utilities that are subadditive instead of additive. In particular, the case of submodular utilities
would definitely deserve more attention.
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A Convex Programming Duality
Properties of f∗: We note some useful properties of f∗ here.
• f∗ is strictly convex and differentiable. (even if f is not strictly convex and differentiable)
• f∗∗ = f . (using the assumption that f is strictly convex and differentiable)
• If f is separable, that is f(x) =
∑
i fi(xi), then f∗(µ) =
∑
i f
∗
i (µi).
• If g(x) = cf(x) for some constant c, then g∗(µ) = cf∗(µ/c).
• If g(x) = f(cx) for some constant c, then g∗(µ) = f∗(µ/c).
• If g(x) = f(x+ a) for some constant a, then g∗(µ) = f∗(µ)− µTa.
• If µ and x are such that f(x) + f∗(µ) = µTx then ∇f(x) = µ and ∇f∗(µ) = x.
• Vice versa, if ∇f(x) = µ then ∇f∗(µ) = x and f(x) + f∗(µ) = µTx.
Conjugates of some simple strictly convex and differentiable functions
• If f(x) = 12x
2
, then ∇f(x) = x. Letting µ = x in µTx− f(x), leads to f∗(µ) = 12µ
2
.
• If f(x) = − log(x), then ∇f(x) = −1x . Set µ =
−1
x to get f
∗(µ) = −1 + log(x) = −1− log(−µ).
• If f(x) = x log x, then ∇f(x) = log x + 1 = µ. So x = eµ−1. f∗(µ) = µx − f(x) = x(log x +
1)− x log x = x = eµ−1. That is, f∗(µ) = eµ−1.
Lemma 2. The following pairs of convex programs are duals of each other, i.e., the optimum of the primal
is at most the optimum of the dual (weak duality). If the primal is infeasible, then the dual is unbounded
(and vice versa).
Primal: max
∑
i cixi − f(x) s.t.
∀ j,
∑
i aijxi ≤ bj ,
Dual: min
∑
j bjλj + f
∗(µ) s.t.
∀ i,
∑
j aijλj = ci − µi,
∀ j, λj ≥ 0.
If the primal constraints are strictly feasible, i.e., there exists xˆ such that for all j ∑i aij xˆi < bj , then the
two optima are the same (strong duality) and the following generalized complementary slackness conditions
characterize them:
• xi > 0⇒
∑
j aijλj = ci − µi, λj > 0⇒
∑
i aijxi = Bi and
• x and µ form a complementary pair wrt f , i.e., µ = ∇f(x), x = ∇f∗(µ) and f(x) + f∗(µ) = µTx.
Proof. Suppose first that the set of linear constraints is itself infeasible, that is, there is no solution to the set
of inequalities
∀ j,
∑
i
aijxi ≤ bj . (4)
Then by Farkas’ lemma, we know that there exists numbers λj ≥ 0 for all j such that
∀ i,
∑
j
aijλj = 0, and
∑
j
λjbj < 0.
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Now consider the dual solution with these λjs and µi = ci. This is feasible, and the dual objective is
f∗(c) +
∑
j λjbj . By multiplying all the λjs by a large positive number, the dual objective can be made
arbitrarily small (goes to −∞).
Now suppose that the feasible region defined by the inequalities (4) and the domain of f defined as
dom(f) = {x : f(x) < ∞} are disjoint. Further assume for now that f∗(c) < ∞ and that there is a strict
separation between the two, meaning that for all x feasible and y ∈ dom(f), d(x, y) > ǫ for some ǫ > 0.
Then once again by Farkas’ lemma we have that there exist λj ≥ 0 for all j and δ > 0 such that
∀y ∈ dom(f),
∑
i,j
aijλjyi >
∑
j
λjbj(1 + δ).
This implies that the dual objective is < f∗(c) − δ∑j λjbj , and as before, by multiplying all the λj by a
large positive number, g can be made arbitrarily small.
Now we may assume that the primal is feasible. Define the Lagrangian function
L(x, λ) :=
∑
i
cixi − f(x) +
∑
j
λj(bj −
∑
i
aijxi).
We say that x is feasible if it satisfies all the constraints of the primal problem. Note that for all λ ≥ 0 and
x feasible, L(x, λ) ≥
∑
i cixi − f(x). Define the dual function
g(λ) = max
x
L(x, λ).
So for all λ, x, g(λ) ≥ L(x, λ). Thus minλ≥0 g(λ) is an upper bound on the optimum value for the primal
program. The dual program is essentially minλ≥0 g(λ). We further simplify it as follows. Letting µi =
ci −
∑
j aijλj, we can rewrite the expression for L as
L =
∑
i
µixi − f(x) +
∑
j
bjλj.
Now note that g(λ) = maxx L(x, λ) = maxx{
∑
i µixi − f(x)}+
∑
j bjλj = f
∗(µ) +
∑
j bjλj . Thus we
get the dual optimization problem:
min
∑
j bjλj + f
∗(µ) s.t.
∀ i,
∑
j aijλj = ci − µi,
∀ j, λj ≥ 0.
Lemma 3. The following pairs of convex programs are duals of each other. The dual variables pj of an
optimal solution are equilibrium prices of the corresponding linear Fisher market.
EG Program: max
∑
iBi log ui s.t.
∀ i, ui ≤
∑
j vijxij ,
∀ j,
∑
i xij ≤ 1,
xij ≥ 0.
min
∑
j pj −
∑
iBi log(βi) s.t. (1)
∀ i, j, pj ≥ vijβi.
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Proof. We let the dual variable corresponding to the constraint ui ≤
∑
j uijxij be βi and the dual variable
corresponding to the constraint
∑
i xij ≤ 1 be pj . We also need a variable µi that corresponds to the variable
ui in the primal program since it appears in the objective in the form of a concave function, mi log ui. We
now calculate the conjugate of this function. Recall that if f(x) = − log x then f∗(µ) = −1− log(−µ), and
if g(x) = cf(x) then g∗(µ) = cf∗(µ/c). Therefore if g(x) = −c log x then g∗(µ) = −c− c log(−µ/c) =
c log c − c − c log(−µ). In the dual objective, we can ignore the constant terms, c log c − c. We are now
ready to write down the dual program which is as follows.
min
∑
j pj −
∑
imi log(−µi) s.t.
∀ i, j, pj ≥ uijβi,
∀ i, βi = −µi.
We can easily eliminate µi from the above to get the program as stated in the lemma.
Lemma 4. The following convex programs are duals of each other.
min
∑
j e
qj +
∑
iBiγi s.t. (2)
∀ i, j, γi + qj ≥ log vij.
max
∑
i,j bij log vij −
∑
j(pj log pj − pj) s.t. (CP)
∀ j,
∑
i bij = pj ,
∀ i,
∑
j bij = Bi,
∀ i, j, bij ≥ 0.
Proof. We construct the dual of (2) as outlined in the Section 3. Again, we need to calculate the conjugate
of the convex function that appears in the objective, namely ex. We could calculate it from scratch, or derive
it from the ones we have already calculated. Recall that if f(x) = ex−1, then f∗(µ) = µ log µ, and if
g(x) = f(x+ a) then g∗(µ) = f∗(µ) − µTa. Thus if g(x) = ex = f(x+ 1) then g∗(µ) = f∗(µ) − µ =
µ log µ− µ. The dual variable corresponding to the constraint γi + qj ≥ log uij is bij and the dual variable
corresponding to eqj is pj . The structure of the dual program now follows from Lemma 2.
A.1 Extensions
The Eisenberg-Gale convex program can be generalized to capture the equilibrium of many other markets,
such as markets with Leontief utilities, or network flow markets. In fact, [16] identify a whole class of such
markets whose equilibrium is captured by convex programs similar to that of Eisenberg and Gale (called
EG markets). We can take the dual of all such programs to get corresponding generalizations for the convex
program (1). For instance, a Leontief utility is of the form Ui = minj {xij/φij} for some given values φij .
The Eisenberg-Gale-type convex program for Fisher markets with Leontief utilities is as follows, along with
its dual (after some simplification as before).
Primal: max
∑
imi log ui s.t.
∀ i, j, ui ≤ xij/φij ,
∀ j,
∑
i xij ≤ 1,
xij ≥ 0.
Dual: min
∑
j pj−
∑
imi log(βi) s.t.
∀ i,
∑
j φijpj = βi.
In general for an EG-type convex program, the dual has the objective function ∑j pj −∑imi log(βi)
where βi is the minimum cost buyer i has to pay in order to get one unit of utility. For instance, for the
network flow market, where the goods are edge capacities in a network and the buyers are source-sink pairs
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looking to maximize the flow routed through the network, then βi is the cost of the cheapest path between
the source and the sink given the prices on the edges.
However, for some markets, it is not clear how to generalize the Eisenberg-Gale convex program, but
the dual generalizes easily. In each of the cases, the optimality conditions can be easily seen to be equivalent
to equilibrium conditions. We now show some examples of this.
Quasi-linear utilities
Suppose the utility of buyer i is
∑
j(uij − pj)xij . In particular, if all the prices are such that pj > uij , then
the buyer prefers to not be allocated any good and go back with his budget unspent. It is easy to see that
the following convex program captures the equilibrium prices for such utilities. In fact, given this convex
program, one could take its dual to get an EG-type convex program as well.
Primal: min
∑
j pj−
∑
imi log(βi) s.t.
(5)
∀ i, j, pj ≥ uijβi,
∀ i, βi ≤ 1.
Dual: max
∑
imi log ui − vi s.t.
∀ i, ui ≤
∑
j uijxij + vi,
∀ j,
∑
i xij ≤ 1,
xij, vi ≥ 0.
Although this is a small modification of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program, it is not clear how one
would arrive at this directly without going through the dual.
Transaction costs
Suppose that we are given, for every pair, buyer i and good j, a transaction cost cij that the buyer has to
pay per unit of the good in addition to the price of the good. Thus the total money spent by buyer i is∑
j(pj + cij)xij . Chakraborty et al. [5] show that the following convex program captures the equilibrium
prices for such markets.
min
∑
j pj −
∑
imi log(βi) s.t. (6)
∀ i, j, pj + cij ≥ vijβi,
∀ i, βi ≤ 1.
Alternate proof of Gibbs’ inequality
Consider the following convex program.
max
∑
j∈Si
(bij log vij − bij log bij) s.t.∑
j∈Si
bij = 1,
bij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Si.
Using the duality techniques developed in this paper, we write the following dual of this program.
minαi +
∑
j∈Si
eµij−1s.t.
∀j ∈ Si, αi ≥ log vij − µij.
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Suppose that we fix the value of αi. Given this, we want to set µij to be as small as possible s.t. the constraint
αi ≥ log vij−µij is satisfied, which gives us µij = log vij−αi. Then eµij−1 = vije−1−αi , and the objective
can be written as a function of αi as
αi +
∑
j∈Si
vije
−1−αi .
This can be minimized by setting the derivative to zero, which gives
1−
∑
j∈Si
vije
−1−αi = 0
⇔ eαi+1 =
∑
j∈Si
vij ⇔ αi + 1 = log(
∑
j∈Si
vij).
The minimum value of the objective is then αi + 1 = log(
∑
j∈Si
vij), which is also obtained in the primal
by setting bij = vij∑
k∈Si
vik
.
B Convex Program, Existence and Uniqueness for the SR equilibrium
In this section, we give the proof of Lemma 7, that the f-SR program captures the SR equilibrium. We
then study the existence and the uniqueness of the SR equilibrium and we show a necessary and sufficient
condition for its existence. On the uniqueness side, we show that the spending vector q = (q1, . . . , qm),
where qj is the money spent on good j, is unique. Although in the Fisher model we have the uniqueness of
price equilibrium, it is easy to see that this is not true for the SR equilibrium. Consider a market with only
one buyer with utility function u(x) = x1 and one seller. Let B1 = 1 and c1 = 1. It is easy to see that every
price bigger than 1 is an SR equilibrium price.
We first state the f-SR program, with a log transformation of the objective function, and generalized
for arbitrary spending limits for each good, as in the definition of the general SR equilibrium model. This
convex program is a natural extension of program CP presented in Section 4, with an additional set of
constraints for sellers having earning limits:
max
∑
i,j bij log vij −
∑
j(qj log qj − qj) s.t. (f-SR)
∀j,
∑
i bij = qj, (7)
∀i,
∑
j bij = Bi, (8)
∀j, qj ≤ cj , (9)
∀i, j, bij ≥ 0. (10)
Here bij is the amount of money buyer i spends on good j, and qj is the total amount of spending on good
j. Constraint 9 makes sure that the spending on good j does not exceed the earning limit of seller j.
Lemma 7. The f-SR program computes the SR equilibrium. The variables bij capture the amount of money
spent by buyer i on good j, and the variables qj capture the total spending on good j. The prices pj can be
recovered from the optimal dual variables.
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Proof. Let λj , µj, ηi be the dual variables corresponding to the first three constraints of the SR program. By
the KKT conditions, optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
1. ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ A : log vij − λj − ηi ≤ 0
2. ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ A : bij > 0⇒ log vij − λj − ηi = 0
3. ∀j ∈ A : − log qj + λj − µj = 0
4. ∀j ∈ A : µj ≥ 0
5. ∀j ∈ A : µj > 0⇒ qj = cj
From the first 3 conditions, we have ∀i ∈ B, j ∈ A : vij
qje
µj ≤ e
ηi and if bij > 0 then vijqjeµj = e
ηi .
Let pj = qjeµj . We will show that p is an equilibrium price with spending b. From the above observation,
it is easy to see that each buyer i only spends money on his maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) goods at
price p, i.e., goods that give her maximum utility per unit money spent. We also have to check that an
optimal solution given by the convex program satisfies the market clearing conditions. The constraint that∑
j bij = 1 guarantees that each buyer i must spend all his money. Therefore, we only have to show that the
amount seller j earns is the minimum between pj and cj . If qj = cj and qj ≤ qjeµj = pj . If qj < cj then
µj = 0 and pj = qj < cj . Thus, in both cases, qj = min(pj , cj) as desired.
Lemma 11. An SR equilibrium price exists if and only if ∑j cj ≥∑iBi.
Proof. An equilibrium price exists if and only if the feasible region of the f-SR convex program is not
empty. We first prove that for the case of linear utility function, the program is feasible if and only if∑
j cj ≥
∑
iBi. If
∑
j cj <
∑
iBi then the feasible region is empty because the set of constraints 7, 9
and 8 can not be satisfied together. If
∑
j cj ≥
∑
iBi then yij =
Bicj∑
j cj
gives a feasible solution because∑
i yij = cj
∑
iBi∑
j cj
≤ cj and
∑
j yij = Bi
∑
j cj∑
j cj
= Bi.
Lemma 12. The spending vector q of the SR equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Consider two distinct price equilibria p and p′, their corresponding spending vectors q and q′ and
their corresponding demand vectors x and x′. Note that pj ≥ p′j ⇒ qj ≥ q′j because qj = xjpj =
min(1,
cj
pj
)pj ≥ min(1,
cj
p′
j
)p′j = q
′
j . Consider price vector r = (r1, . . . , rm) where ∀k, rk = max(pk, p′k),
its corresponding spending vector qr and its corresponding demand vectors xr. Note that by changing prices
from p to r we may only increasing the prices. Therefore, it is easy to see under linear utility functions the
demand of good j going from prices p to r would not decrease if p′j < pj = rj . Therefore, we have
qrj = x
r
jrj = x
r
jpj ≥ xjpj = qj ≥ q
′
j . We can do the same for all j and show ∀j, qrj = max(qj , q′j). For
the sake of a contradiction suppose ∃j, qj > q′j then using the later it is easy to show
∑
j q
r
j >
∑
j qj =∑
j q
′
j =
∑
iBi which is contradiction because the money spent on goods cannot be more than the total
budget. Therefore, ∀j , qj = q′j and the lemma follows.
B.1 Rationality of the SR equilibrium
In this section, we prove rationality results for the spending restricted outcome. Specifically, we show that
for those market models, a rational equilibrium exists if an equilibrium exists and all the parameters are
rational numbers.
Lemma 13. In spending-restricted market model under linear utility functions, a rational equilibrium exists
if∑j cj ≥∑iBi and all the parameters specified are rational numbers.
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Proof. Let Ai be the set of goods that buyer i spends money on, A be the family of Ai’s, and L be the set of
sellers reaching their earning limits. An equilibrium price p, the corresponding spending b and inverse MBB
value α, if existed, must be a point inside the polyhedron P (A, L) bounded by the following constraints:
∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈ Ai vijαi = pj
∀j ∈M vijαi ≤ pj
∀i ∈ N,∀j 6∈ Ai bij = 0
∀i ∈ N,
∑
j
bij = Bi
∀j ∈ L
∑
i
bij = cj pj ≥ cj
∀j 6∈ L
∑
i
bij = pj pj ≤ cj
∀i ∈ N, j ∈M bij ≥ 0
If an equilibrium price exists, then A and L such that P (A, L) is non-empty must also exist. Every point
inside that non-empty polyhedron must also correspond to an equilibrium price. Since vij’s, Bi’s and cj’s
are rational numbers, a vertex of P (A, L) gives a rational equilibrium price. It then follows from Lemma
11 that a rational equilibrium exists if and only if
∑
j cj ≥
∑
iBi.
C SR equilibrium with Spending Constraint Utilities
We next define the spending constraint model. As before, let M be a set of divisible goods and N a set of
buyers, |M | = m, |N | = n. Assume that the goods are numbered from 1 to m and the buyers are numbered
from 1 to n. Each buyer i ∈ N comes to the market with a specified amount of money, say Bi ∈ Q+, and
we are specified the quantity, bj ∈ Q+ of each good j ∈ M . For i ∈ N and j ∈ M , let f ij : [0, Bi] → R+
be the rate function of buyer i for good j; it specifies the rate at which i derives utility per unit of j received,
as a function of the amount of her budget spent on j. If the price of j is fixed at pj per unit amount of j,
then the function f ij/pj gives the rate at which i derives utility per dollar spent, as a function of the amount
of her budget spent on j. Define gij : [0, Bi]→ R+ as follows:
gij(x) =
∫ x
0
f ij(y)
pj
dy.
This function gives the utility derived by i on spending x dollars on good j at price pj .
In this paper, we will deal with the case that f ij ’s are decreasing step functions. If so, gij will be a
piecewise-linear and concave function. The linear version of Fisher’s problem [3] is the special case in
which each f ij is the constant function so that gij is a linear function. Given prices p = (p1, . . . , pm) of all
goods, each buyer wants a utility maximizing bundle of goods. Prices p are equilibrium prices if each good
with a positive price is fully sold.
The convex program for spending restricted model under spending constraint utility functions is as
follows:
max
∑
i,j,l
blij log v
l
ij −
∑
j
(qj log qj − qj) s.t. (P2)
∀j,
∑
i,l
blij = qj, (11)
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∀i,
∑
j,l
blij = Bi, (12)
∀i, j, l ∈ S, blij ≤ B
l
ij , (13)
∀j, qj ≤ cj , (14)
∀i, j, l ∈ S, blij ≥ 0. (15)
Here blij is the amount of money buyer i spends on good j under segment l, Blij is length of the segment l,
and qj is the total amount of spending on good j.
Lemma 14. Convex program P2 captures SR equilibrium prices of SR market model under spending con-
straint utility function.
Proof. Let λj, µj , ηi, γijl be the dual variables for constraints 11, 14, 12, 13 respectively. By the KKT
conditions, optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
1. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M, l ∈ S : log vlij − λj − ηi − γijl ≤ 0
2. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M, l ∈ S : blij > 0⇒ log vlij − λj − ηi − γijl = 0
3. ∀j ∈M : − log qj + λj − µj = 0
4. ∀j ∈M : µj ≥ 0
5. ∀j ∈M : µj > 0⇒ qj = cj
6. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M, l ∈ S : γijl ≥ 0
7. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M, l ∈ S : γijl > 0⇒ blij = Blij
Let pj = qjeµj . We will prove that p is an equilibrium price with spending b. The second KKT condition
says that for a fixed pair of buyer i and good j, blij > 0 implies
vlij
eγijl
= eλjeηi
Therefore, the ratio vlij/eγijl is the same for every segment l under which i spends money on j. From KKT
condition 7, γijl > 0 implies blij = Blij . It follows that for each good j, i must finish spending money on a
segment with higher rate before starting spending money on a segment with lower rate.
From the first 3 KKT conditions, we have:
vlij
qje
γijleµj
≤ eηi
and equality happens when blij > 0. For every segment that i can still spend money on, blij must be less than
Blij , and thus γijl = 0. Therefore, for every j and l such that Blij > blij > 0, we have
vlij
pj
=
vlij
qjeµj
= eηi
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and this ratio v
l
ij
pj
is maximized among all segments that i can spend money on, i.e. segments such that
blij < B
l
ij . Therefore, we can conclude that each buyer i is spending according to his best spending strategy.
By complementary slackness condition, if qj < cj then µi = 0 and qj = pj . Otherwise, if pj = cj then
qj ≤ pj . Therefore, in this model, the amount seller j earns is the minimum between cj and pj .
Existence and Uniqueness We first show that the same condition that works for linear utilities also works
for spending constraint utilities.
Lemma 15. For spending constraint utility functions, an equilibrium price exists if and only if ∑j cj ≥∑
iBi.
Proof. An equilibrium price exists if and only if the feasible region of the convex program is not empty.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 11, we can prove that the program is feasible if and only if
∑
j cj ≥
∑
iBi.
If
∑
j cj <
∑
iBi then the feasible region is empty because the set of constraints 11, 14 and 12 can not
be satisfied together. Using a similar argument as in the previous part, we can show that if the amount of
money that i spends on j is Bicj/
∑
j cj then constraints 11, 14 and 12 are all satisfied. We only need to
guarantee that contraint 13 is satisfied as well. This can be done by choosing appropriate ylij’s such that∑
l y
l
ij =
Bicj∑
j cj
and ylij ≤ Blij .
Then, following the same steps as those in the proof of Lemma 12, we also show that the spending vector
for spending constraint utilities is unique as well.
Lemma 16. For spending constraint utility functions the spending vector q is unique.
C.1 Rationality of SR equilibria under spending constraint utility
Lemma 17. In spending restricted market model under spending constraint utility functions, a rational
equilibrium exists if∑j cj ≥∑iBi and all the parameters specified are rational numbers.
Proof. For a buyer i and good j, let S+ij be the set of segments l such that blij = Blij , S0ij be the set of
segments such that Blij > blij > 0, and S
−
ij be the set of segments such that blij = 0. Also, let S be the
family of all S+ij , S0ij , S
−
ij sets, and L be the set of sellers reaching their earning limits. An equilibrium price
p, the corresponding spending b and inverse MBB value α, if existed, must be a point inside the polyhedron
P (S, L) bounded by the following constraints:
∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈M,∀l ∈ S+ij v
l
ijαi ≥ pj b
l
ij = B
l
ij
∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈M,∀l ∈ S0ij v
l
ijαi = pj 0 ≤ b
l
ij ≤ B
l
ij
∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈M,∀l ∈ S−ij v
l
ijαi ≤ pj b
l
ij = 0
∀i ∈ N
∑
j,l
blij = Bi
∀j ∈ L
∑
i,l
blij = cj pj ≥ cj
∀j 6∈ L
∑
i,l
blij = pj pj ≤ cj
Suppose that all the parameters specified are rational numbers. Again, we can see that a rational equilibrium
must also exist if an equilibrium exists. It then follows that a rational equilibrium exists if and only if∑
j cj ≥
∑
iBi.
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D Utility restricted market model
D.1 Linear utilities
The convex program for the linear utility with buyers having utility limits is a natural extension of the
Eisenberg-Gale program:
max
∑
iBi log ui s.t. (P3)
∀i,
∑
j xijvij = ui, (16)
∀i, ui ≤ di, (17)
∀j,
∑
i xij ≤ 1, (18)
∀i, j, xij ≥ 0. (19)
In this program, xij is the amount of good j allocated to buyer i, and ui is the amount of utility that buyer i
obtains. Constraint 17 guarantees that the amount of utility buyer i gets does not exceed his utility limit di.
Lemma 18. Convex program P3 captures the equilibrium prices of utility restricted market model under
linear utility function.
Proof. Let λi, µi, pj be the dual variables for contraints 16, 17, 18 respectively. By the KKT conditions,
optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
1. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M : −λivij − pj ≤ 0
2. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M : xij > 0⇒ −λivij − pj = 0
3. ∀i ∈ N : Biui + λi − µi = 0
4. ∀i ∈ N : µi ≥ 0
5. ∀i ∈ N : µi > 0⇒ ui = di
6. ∀j ∈ N : pj ≥ 0
7. ∀j ∈ N : pj > 0⇒
∑
i xij = 1
From the first 3 conditions, we have ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M : vijpj ≤
ui
Bi−µiui
and if xij > 0 then vijpj =
ui
Bi−µiui
.
We will show that p is an equilibrium price with allocation x. From the above observation, it is easy to
see that each buyer i only spends money on his MBB goods at price p. Moreover, we know that if pj > 0
then good j must be fully sold. Therefore, the only remaining thing to prove is that at price p each buyer
either spends all his money or attains his utility limit. If ui = di then buyer i reaches his utility limit and
the amount of money he spends is Bi − µidi, which is at most Bi. If ui < di then µi = 0 and the amount
of money he spends is Bi.
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We now extend these results to Leontief and CES utility functions. Utility function fi is said to be
Leontief if, given parameters aij ∈ R+ ∪ {0} for each good j ∈ M , fi(x) = minj∈M xij/aij . Finally, fi
is said to be constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with parameter ρ if given parameters αj for each good
j ∈M ,
fi(x) =

 n∑
j=1
αjx
ρ
j


1
ρ
.
D.2 Utility restricted market model under Leontief utilities
The convex program for the Leontief utility model is as follows:
max
∑
i
Bi log ui s.t. (P4)
∀i, j, uiφij = xij , (20)
∀i, ui ≤ di, (21)
∀j,
∑
i
xij ≤ 1 (22)
∀i, j, xij ≥ 0. (23)
Lemma 19. Convex program P4 captures the equilibrium prices of utility restricted market model under
Leontief utility function.
Proof. Let λij, µi, pj be the dual variables for constraints 20, 21, 22 respectively. By the KKT conditions,
optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
1. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M : −λij − pj ≤ 0
2. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M : xij > 0⇒ −λij − pj = 0
3. ∀i ∈ N : Biui +
∑
j λijφij − µi = 0
4. ∀i ∈ N : µi ≥ 0
5. ∀i ∈ N : µi > 0⇒ ui = di
6. ∀j ∈M : pj ≥ 0
7. ∀j ∈M : pj > 0⇒
∑
i xij = 1
Notice that in this model, we may assume that ui > 0 for all i ∈ N . It follows from constraint 20 that
xij = 0 if and only if φij = 0. From the second KKT condition, we know that if φij > 0, we must have
λij = −pj . Substituting in the third condition we have:
Bi
ui
− µi =
∑
j
pjφij
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Therefore,
Bi − µiui =
∑
j
pjφij
xij
φij
=
∑
j
pjxij
It follows that Bi− µiui is actually the amount of money that buyer i spends. By complementary slackness
condition, if ui < di then µi = 0 and i spends all his budget. Otherwise, if ui = di then Bi − µiui ≤ Bi.
Therefore, in this model, a buyer i either spends all his budget or attains his utility limit. Moreover, we know
that if pj > 0 then good j is fully sold. Thus, p is an equilibrium price with allocation x.
D.3 Utility restricted marked model under CES utilities
The convex program for the CES utility model with parameter ρ is as follows:
max
∑
i
Bi log ui s.t. (P5)
∀i, ui =
(∑
vijx
ρ
ij
) 1
ρ
, (24)
∀i, ui ≤ di, (25)
∀j,
∑
i
xij ≤ 1, (26)
∀i, j, xij ≥ 0. (27)
Notice that in this model, ∂ui/∂xij = u1−ρi vijx
ρ−1
ij has the same term u
1−ρ
i vij for all xij’s. Moreover,
∂ui/∂xij decreases when xij increases. It follows that the best spending strategy for a buyer i is to start
with xij = 0 ∀j ∈M and spend money on goods j that maximize the ratio ∂ui/∂xijpj at every point. At the
end of the procedure, all goods j such that xij > 0 will have the same value for ∂ui/∂xijpj , and that value is
the maximum over all goods.
Lemma 20. Convex program P5 captures the equilibrium prices of utility restricted market model under
CES utility function.
Proof. Let λi, µi, pj be the dual variables for constraints 24, 25, 26 respectively. By the KKT conditions,
optimal solutions must satisfy the following:
1. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M : −λiu1−ρi vijx
ρ−1
ij − pj ≤ 0
2. ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M : xij > 0⇒ −λiu1−ρi vijx
ρ−1
ij − pj = 0
3. ∀i ∈ N : Biui + λi − µi = 0
4. ∀i ∈ N : µi ≥ 0
5. ∀i ∈ N : µi > 0⇒ ui = di
6. ∀j ∈M : pj ≥ 0
7. ∀j ∈M : pj > 0⇒
∑
i xij = 1
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We will prove that p is an equilibrium price with allocation x. From the first there KKT conditions, we
have
u1−ρi vijx
ρ−1
ij
pj
≤
ui
Bi − µiui
and equality happens when xij > 0. Therefore, x is in agreement with the best spending strategy of the
buyers, which says that for each buyer i, if xij > 0 then ∂ui/∂xijpj is maximized over all j’s. Moreover, we
can see that Bi − µiui is the amount of money buyer i spends. By complementary slackness condition, if
ui < di then µi = 0 and i spends all his budget. Otherwise, if ui = di then Bi − µiui ≤ Bi. Therefore,
in this model, a buyer i either spends all his budget or attains his utility limit. Moreover, we know that if
pj > 0 then good j is fully sold. Thus, p is an equilibrium price with allocation x.
D.4 Rationality of equilibria for UR market model under linear utilities
Lemma 21. In UR market model under linear utility functions, a rational equilibrium exists if all the pa-
rameters specified are rational numbers.
Proof. Let Ai be the set of goods that buyer i spends money on, A be the family of Ai’s, and L be the set of
buyers reaching their utility limits. An equilibrium price p, the corresponding spending b and inverse MBB
value α, if existed, must be a point inside the polyhedron P (A, L) bounded by the following constraints:
∀i ∈ N,∀j ∈ Ai vijαi = pj
∀j ∈M vijαi ≤ pj
∀i ∈ N,∀j 6∈ Ai bij = 0
∀j ∈ N
∑
i
bij = pj
∀i ∈ L
∑
j
bij = αidi
∑
j
bij ≤ Bi
∀i 6∈ L
∑
j
qij ≤ αidi
∑
j
bij = Bi
∀i ∈ N, j ∈M bij ≥ 0
Suppose that all the parameters specified in this model are rational numbers. By a similar argument to
Lemma 13, we can see that an equilibrium exists if and only if a rational equilibrium exists. It follow from
Lemma 22 that a rational equilibrium price must always exist if all the parameters specified are rational
numbers.
D.5 Existence and Uniqueness of UR equilibrium
For UR market model, we show that an equilibrium always exists for all utility functions we mentioned in
the previous section. On the uniqueness side, the utility vector is unique. To verify that the price vector
is not unique, consider a market with only one buyer with utility function u(x) = x1 and one seller. Let
d1 = 1 and B1 = 2. It is easy to see every price in interval [1, 2] is an equilibrium price.
Lemma 22. In UR market model under linear, Leontief and CES utility functions, an equilibrium price
always exists.
Proof. An equilibrium price exists if and only if the feasible region of the convex program is not empty. In
P3, P4 and P5, xij = 0 for all i, j is a feasible solution. Therefore, the feasible region is not empty and an
equilibrium exists.
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Lemma 23. In UR market model under linear, Leontief and CES utility functions, the utilities of an equilib-
rium are unique.
Proof. In section D, we showed every equilibrium correspond to an solution of a convex program with an
objective function of the form ∑iBi log ui. It is easy to see that the objective function is strictly concave.
Therefore, there is a unique vector u that maximizes the objective function and the lemma follows.
E Proofs of Theorem 1 and Lemma 10 (Approximation Factor Bounds)
E.1 Approximation Factor Upper Bound
For each item j that has more than one child-agent in the spending graph Q(b), remove the edges connecting
it to all but the one child-agent that spends the most money on j, i.e., the one with the largest bij value. This
yields a pruned spending graph P (b) that is also a forest of trees. We refer to the trees of the pruned graph
P (b) as the matching-trees. In every matching-tree T with k ≥ 2 agents, when the algorithm reaches its
last step, every remaining item has exactly one parent-agent and one child-agent, so all but one agent can
be matched to one of these items. Our proof shows that there exists a matching of the remaining items such
that the agents within T have a “high” NSW.
A naive way to match the agents in the last step of the algorithm would be to match all of them, except
the one that has accrued the highest value during the previous steps. It was already observed in [7] that,
for any matching-tree T of k agents, there exists an agent who was assigned value at least 1/(2k) during
Steps 3 and 4 of the algorithm, so we could match every agent in T , except him. But, what is the worst case
distribution of value that can arise in this matching?
If T is some matching-tree of the pruned spending graph P (b), then let MT denote the union of items
in T with the items that were assigned to agents in T in Steps 3 and 4. Also, let H be the set of items with
pj > 1 in the SR equilibrium and HT the subset of those items that belong to T . In proving this theorem,
we use the following lemma from [7].
Lemma 24 ([7]). For any matching-tree T with k agents, there exists an agent i ∈ T who, during Steps 3
and 4 received one or more items that she values at least 1/(2k). Also, for items in MT :∑
j∈MT
qj ≥ k −
1
2
. (28)
Let x′ be the integral allocation that would arise if we follow the SRR algorithm up to Step 4, and then
use the naive matching described above. For simplicity, we assume that the valuations of the agents are
scaled in such a way that vij = pj if bij > 0, which allows us to use SR-UB as an upper bound of OPT. We
begin by showing that, if every agent receives a value of at least 1/2 in x′, then the theorem follows. To
verify this fact, note that every agent who is matched to an item j with price pj > 1 has a value of at least
pj , and every other agent has a value of at least 1/2, so
(∏
i
vi(x
′)
)1/n
≥

 1
2n
·
∏
j∈H
pj


1/n
≥
1
2
·
(∏
i
vi(x
∗)
)1/n
.
For any matching-tree with k = 1 agent, Inequality (28) implies that this agent will receive value at
least k − 1/2 = 1/2. Therefore, we now, assume that there exists some matching-tree T with k ≥ 2 agents
such that some agent α in T gets a value less than 1/2 in x′. Let vα(x′), or vα for short, be the value that
this agent receives. Since vα < 1/2, this agent is the only one in T that was not matched to an item with
pj > 1/2, so every other agent i in T has vi(x′) ≥ 1/2.
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Lemma 25. Over all the possible allocations x′, the one with the minimum product of the valuations, has
at least
⌊
k−2vα
1+2vα
⌋
agents with value vi(x′) ≥ 1.
Proof. Let k1 be the number of agents with value at least 1 in x′, and assume that k1 ≤
⌊
k−2vα
1+2vα
⌋
− 1. Since
every agent other than α was matched to an item with qj ≥ 1/2, we know that the value of the k1 agents
before the matching was at most vα. Hence, for each such agent i the sum of the qj values of the items that
were assigned to i in x′ is at most 1+ vα. As a result, if M ′ is the union of items that were assigned to agent
α and the k1 agents, we know that
∑
j∈M ′ qj ≤ k1(1 + vα) + vα.
Using Inequality (28), we get
∑
j∈M\M ′
qj ≥ k −
1
2
− (k1(1 + vα) + vα) =
1
2
(k − k1) +
1
2
k −
(
1
2
+ vα
)
(k1 + 1).
But, we have assumed that k1 + 1 ≤
⌊
k−2vα
1+2vα
⌋
≤ k−2vα1+2vα , so∑
j∈M\M ′
qj ≥
1
2
(k − k1) +
1
2
k −
k − 2vα
2
=
1
2
(k − k1) + vα.
Therefore, the remaining k − k1 − 1 agents have a total value more than (k − k1)/2, i.e., strictly more than
1/2 on average. It also implies that at least two of these agents have value strictly more than 1/2. If k−k1−2
agents had value equal to 1/2 then the remaining agent would have a value more than 12(k−k1)−
1
2(k−k1−
2) = 1, which contradicts our assumption that only k1 agents have value at least 1. Let v1, v2 ∈ (1/2, 1) be
the values of two such agents in the worst case outcome. It is then easy to verify that, if we were to instead
give value 1/2 to the one agent and v1 + v2 − 1/2 to the other, the NSW would drop. This contradicts our
assumption that this is a worst case outcome.
Lemma 26. For any matching-tree T with k agents, the allocation x of the SRR algorithm satisfies∏
i∈T
vi(x
′) ≥
1
2k
∏
j∈HT
pj .
Proof. Let k1 be the number of agents with vi(x′) ≥ 1. Given any agent i among these k1 agents, if j is the
item that he was matched to, then has value vi(x′) ≥ max{1, pj}. As a result, the product of the values of
these k1 players is at least
∏
j∈HT
pj . Therefore, it suffices to show that the product of the remaining k− k1
agents is at least 1/2k .
Among the k2 = k − k1 − 1 agents that get value in [1/2, 1), it is easy to verify that their product is
minimized when at most one agent among them gets value higher than 1/2. If we let vβ be the value of that
player, and using Inequality (28), we get
vβ ≥ k −
1
2
−
[
k1(1 + vα) + vα + (k − k1 − 2)
1
2
]
. (29)
If we let k1 = k−2vα1+2vα and δ = k1−k1 =
k−2vα
1+2vα
−
⌊
k−2vα
1+2vα
⌋
be the rounding error, then Inequality (29) yields
vβ ≥
δ + 1
2
.
This implies that∏
i∈T
vi(x
′) ≥
vαvβ
2k−k1−2
∏
j∈HT
pj ≥
vα
2k−k1−1
δ + 1
2δ
∏
j∈HT
pj ≥
vα
2k−k1−1
∏
j∈HT
pj ,
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where the last inequality comes from the fact that δ + 1 ≥ 2δ for δ ∈ [0, 1]. To verify this fact note that
(δ + 1 − 2δ)′′ = −2δ ln2 2 < 0, so this is minimized at either δ = 0 or δ = 1, both of which yield
δ+1− 2δ = 0. To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that for every vα ∈ [1/(2k), 1/2] and every k ≥ 2
we have
vα
2k−k1−1
≥
1
2k
or, equivalently, vα2
k+1
1+2vα ≥ 1.
For k ≥ 7, it is easy to verify that this inequality holds. In particular, using the fact that vα ∈ [1/(2k), 1/2],
vα2
k+1
1+2vα ≥
1
2k
2
k+1
1+2 12 ≥
2
k+1
2
2k
≥ 1, for k ≥ 7.
Note that vα2
k+1
1+2vα is minimized at the same points as log vα+ k+11+2vα . Taking a derivative w.r.t. vα gives(
log vα +
k + 1
1 + 2vα
)′
=
1
vα ln 2
−
2(k + 1)
(1 + 2vα)2
.
For k ≤ 4, this derivative is positive for any value of vα, so vα2
k+1
1+2vα is minimized at vα = 1/(2k), where
its value is equal to 12k2
k(k+1)
k+1 = 2
k
2k ≥ 1. Finally, replacing k = 5 and k = 6 and minimizing vα2
k+1
1+2vα
over all values of vα also shows that this function is minimized at vα = 1/10 and vα = 1/12 respectively,
and its value is at least 1, which concludes the proof.
The inequality of Lemma 26 implies the desired approximation factor if we observe that
(∏
i
vi(x)
)1/n
=
(∏
T
∏
i∈T
vi(x)
)1/n
≥
1
2

∏
j∈H
pj


1/n
.
E.2 Approximation Factor Lower Bound
Proof. Consider an instance with m = 2κ items and n = κ + 1 agents. Each agent i ∈ [1, κ] has a value
of 1/2 for item i and a value of 1/2 + 1/κ for item 2i. The value of these agents for every other item is 0.
Finally, agent κ + 1 values every item from 1 to κ for a value of 1 and has value 0 for the rest. The item
prices in the SR equilibrium for this instance are 1/2 for the first κ items and 1/2+1/κ for the remaining κ
items. Agent κ+ 1 spends 1/κ on each one of the first κ items, while each agent i ∈ [1, κ] spends 1− 1/κ
on item i and his remaining budget of 1 + 1/κ on item 2i.
Facing this SR equilibrium, assume that the SRR algorithm chooses agent κ + 1 as the root-agent in
Step 2, then it would assign all of the first κ items to this agent. To verify this fact note that for every item
j among the first κ ones, qj = 1/2 and agent κ + 1 is the parent-agent. On the other hand, every other
agent i ∈ [1, κ] would get only item 2i. This leads to a product of valuations equal to κ(2+1/κ)κ . If, on the
other hand, agent κ + 1 was allocated just one of the first κ items and gave each of the other κ − 1 items
to the agents that value them, the product of the valuations would be more than 12 . For large values of κ the
ratio between the NSW of these two outcomes converges to 2. Finally, note that, even if the algorithm chose
some different agent as the root, the result would not be affected in the limit.
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